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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDDIE SOLIZ and VIDALE 
SOLIZ, 'by Eddie Soliz, 
her Guardian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EDWARD WILSION 
AMMERMAN, 'by his 
Guardi1an Ad Litem, LaVerne 
Bruce Ammerman, and 
LaVERNE BRUCE 
AM'ME'RMAN, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATE·MENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
10028 
This action is one brought by Eddie Soliz and 
his daughter, Vidale Soliz, to recover damages for 
personal injuries alleged to have been received in 
an automobile accident which occurred on March 
21, 1962 at the intersection of Second West and 
200 North Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER CO'URT 
Two defendants were named in plaintiffs' Com-
plaint, Edward Wilson Ammerman and his father, 
La \T erne Bruce Ammerman. At the pre-trial of the 
action plaintiffs acknowledged that they had no 
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evidence of any agency rela1tionshi p which existed 
between Edward Wilson Ammerman and his father, 
La Verne Bruce Ammerman, whereupon the case 
was dismissed as against LaVerne Bruce Ammer-
man, leJaving only the defendant Edward Wilson 
Ammerman in the case ( R. 28). 
The action was tried to a jury in Salt Lake 
County, Utah commencing September 24, 1'963. A 
verdict was rendered i1n favor of Vidale Soliz in the 
amount of $89.00 special damages land $500.00 gen-
eral damages. The Judgment thereafter entered 
upon this verdict was satisfied by the defendant 
and is not involved in this cruse. 
A verdict was rendered in favor of the plain-
tiff Eddie Soliz and against the defendant in the 
amount of $446.25 special damages and '$1'5,000.00 
general damages. A Motion For New Trial was filed 
in the action brought by Eddie Soliz and was denied 
by the lower court. 
REILIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant asks that the order of the lower 
court, denyi1ng 'appellant's Motion For New Trial, 
be reversed and that the jury verdict in the case 
brought by Eddie 1Soliz be set aside, 1and that the 
appellant be awarded a new trial upon the follow-
ing grounds : 
(a) The court erred in permitting 
plaintiff to recall Dr. D. C. Bernrson for a 
second time after the defendant's doctor had 
testified, and in not limliting Dr. Bernson's 
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testimony to a rebuttal of matters testified to 
by defendant's doctor; 
(b) The court erred in refusing x-rays 
received as exhibits in the case to be taken 
into the jury room; 
(c) The court erred in its instructions 
given to the jury; and 
(d) The verdict of the jury herein is 
excessive and appears to have been given un-
der the influence of passion or prejudice. 
STA:TEMENT OF FACTS 
The automobile accident which gave rise to this 
action occurred on March 21, 19H2 at the intersec-
tion of Second West and 200 North Streets in Salt 
Lake City, Utah at about 8:15 o'clock A.M. (R. 
251). Plaintiff Eddie Soliz was operating a motor 
vehicle and traveling south on Second West Street 
in the outside lane of two south-bound lanes. Two 
of his children were with him. His son, Eddie Soliz, 
Jr., was s~ated in the middle of the front seat and 
his daughter, Vidale Soliz (the other plaintiff), was 
seated on the right side of the front seat. Plaintiff 
planned to drop Vi dale off at the West High School 
and Eddie, Jr. at Horace Mann, where the two 
children attended school ( R. 251) . 
Eddie Soliz testified that as he approached the 
intersection the traffic light at the intersection was 
red. It changed to green when he was ·20 to 30 feet 
from the intersection. He observed the first of two 
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automobiles which proceeded north through the in-
tersection (R. 25'3) and then saw a second car 
(defendant's) turn toward the curb but, in his 
words, "didn't think he was going a:ll the way" (R. 
324). 
Defendant EdWiard Wilson Ammerman was 
traveling north on Second West Street, intending 
to make a left hand turn at the intersection of 200 
North and Second West. He was traveling in the 
lane next 'to the center. The traffic light a't the in-
tersection wa:s red when he reached the intersection. 
He stopped his vehicle behind another automobile 
which Wias stopped. When the traffic light turned 
green for north-south bound traffic the first car 
proceeded straight on through the intersection (R. 
204). He moved his car into the intersection and 
came to a second stop in the intersection long enough 
for the intersection to clear so that he could pro-
ceed to make his turn ( R. 205). He did not give an 
arm signal but had hi's left hand turn signal light 
operating (R. 206). After pausing momentarily 
and checking traffic to the north, at which time he 
did not see the Soliz vehicle, he started his left turn, 
whereupon the collision occurred, the point of im-
pact being on the outside lane of traffic on the 
west side of Second West ( R. 208). Mter the im-
pact Eddie Soliz told 'the defendant "he was trying 
to make the lights to get his kids to school". On the 
basis of the foregoing testimony the Court found 
negligence :a.s a m'atter of law on the part of the 
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defendant Edward Wilson Ammerman but sub-
mitted the issue of contributory negligence to the 
jury. 
Immediately after the colli'Sion plaintiff and 
his daughter visited the office of Dr. David E. Smith, 
the family physician. Plaintiff stated he was ner-
vous and upset and that he had struck his chest 
on the steering wheel, but did not have much in 
the way of complaints at the time. Dr. Smith testi-
fied that he checked the plaintiff over and found 
nothing significant other than a bruise (R. 124-
125). On the 29th day of Ma~h, 1'9H2 plaintiff 
·again visited Dr. Smith. At that time he complained 
of pain in the central and left area of his chest. A 
cardiogram was performed and found to 'be normal 
(R. 125). Thereafter, on April 10, 1'96~2, some 
twenty days after the accident, the plain tiff again 
Yisited Dr. Smith, complaining of low back pains 
and some neck pain with radi'ation into his arms 
and some difficulty in using his hands ( R. 125). 
Dr. Smith further testified that plaintiff hiad never 
made such complaints prior to the accident (R. 125), 
although ·he had previously tesitified that in July 
of 1960 (which is prior to the accident) Mr. Soliz 
had complained of low back pain without radiation. 
On cross exramination Dr. Smith testified that the 
plaintiff had complained of numbness in his right 
arm at the time of an examination on November 
12, 1960 and that on September 15, 1961 he sent 
:\Ir. Soliz to Dr. Winter, a person who specializes 
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in taking x-rays, because Mr. Soliz was complaining 
of some kind of difficulty in his shoulder ( R. 134). 
After the accident, on May 9, 19'62, the doctor 
again sent Mr. Solitz back to Dr. Winter for x-rays. 
These x-rays revealed no evidence of any interverte-
bral or ruptured disc ( R. 135) but did show a 
condition of hypertrophic arthritis, which the doc-
tor testified is a "lipping of the vertebrae . . . 
that comes out on the side that ca:lcifies" (R. 136). 
He concluded his testimony on cross examination 
by stating that plaintiff had complained of the same 
symptoms before the accident as he had afterward, 
but thiat the symptoms seemed to be increased after 
the acciden1t ( R. 1'36) . 
When questioned about it, the plaintiff Eddie 
Soliz admitted he had seen Dr. Smith for pains in 
his back in July of 19'60 and that he had an area 
of numbness in his right arm, shoulder and fingers 
prior to the accident, which were the same com-
plaints which he had after the accident ( R. 320) . 
The plaintiff was referred by Dr. Smith to 
Dr. D. C. Bernson, a neurosurgeon, who was plain-
tiff's second witness in the trial (R. 144). He ex-
amined the plaintiff on May 23, 1'962, who gave 
him a history that he had been involved in an auto-
mobile accident in March, 1962 and had felt stiff 
and sore but these symptoms gradually 'subsided. 
He stated also that about three to three and one-
half weeks after the accident he began to experi-
ence stiffness and some weakness in bdth hands, 
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which was noticeable primarily in the morning when 
he would first awake and arise from bed. After 
being up and around for a while, using his hands, 
these symptoms would subside and would remain 
absent for the remainder of the day ( R. 146) . Mr. 
Soliz related that he had had the usual childhood 
diseases and 1an appendectomy but denied any other 
serious physical disturbance or ill health other than 
some nervousness (R. 147). (Evidently plaintiff 
did not mention the numbness in his arm that he 
had experienced before the accident.) On the first 
examination Dr. Bernson found plaintiff's systems 
to be all within norm1al limits and also found that 
plaintiff was well developed, nourished and healthy. 
He did not seem to be in any acute distress, nor did 
he appear seriously ill. 
The doctor further testified that the signifi-
cant findings were limilted to those pertinent to the 
plaintiff's neck and primarily to his arms. The 
doctor testified there !appeared to be a slight weak-
ness of the grasp in both upper extremities (R. 
148). Following his initial examination Dr. Bern-
son secured some further x-rays and had him re-
port back in about a month's time, and then again 
about six weeks later (R. 148). During this period 
of time the doctor testified thJat the grip strength 
of the plaintiff's hands had changed ·and that 
changes had occurred in his reflexes in his arm, 
and that he advised plaintiff to be hospitalized for 
further diagnostic study (R. 148). 
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Thereafter plaintiff was hospi1talized and a 
discogram was performed. The doctor explained a 
discogram as a special x-ray m1ade to demonstrate 
an intervertebral disc ( R. 152). A special substance, 
which ca'Sts a shadow on the x-ray similar to that 
which would be cast by a bone, is inserted into the 
discs between the vertebrae of the back with a needle 
similar to a hypo needl~e or spinal needle. If the 
disc is abnorma'l and ruptured the substance or dye 
will leak out through the rupture and 1this can be 
seen on the x-ray by seeing 'the course of the dye 
as it outlines the defect in the disc (R. 1153). 
Dr. Bernson explained this procedure in great 
detaH, stating he examined the x-rays which nr. 
Winter had taken of the cervical spine, which were 
to all intents ·and purposes normal on the plain 
films. The only thing which he saw of any signifi-
cance was a slight increase in motion between the 
5th and 6th vettebrae as compared with the others. 
Based on the information contained 'in these x-rays 
and his know ledge of the vertebrae involved in this 
type of an injury (R. 1'54) the dye was injected in 
the discs between the 4th, 51th and 6th cervical ver-
tebrae ( R. 1'5'3) . 'The doctor further testified that 
he examined the x-rays taken at the time the disco-
gram was done and that these x-rays demonstrated 
a rupture of the upper two of the three discs tha:t he 
had injected, namely the 4th and 5th (R. 157). 
The doctor's recommendation on the basis of this 
diagnosis was that Mr. Soliz shoU'ld consider having 
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these discs removed, provided his symptoms and dis-
comfort and incapacitation, whatever it might be, 
was sufficient to warrant it. The plaintiff, Eddie 
Soliz, told Dr. Bernson that he preferred to wait 
until the symptoms went away or until they got 
bad enough to justify an operation (R. 158). 
Anticipating the testimony of defendant's doc-
tor, plaintiff's counsel then asked Dr. Bernson, uin 
an area where you have ruptured discs, two rup-
tured cervical discs as you found i'n Mr. Soliz, what 
would you expect as to hypertrophic arthritic 
changes as time passes?" After o'lJj~ection the doctor 
was permitted to answer, and testified, ''The pre-
sence of hypertrophic changes on the margins of 
the vertebrae due to degenerated or ruptured discs 
is the usual state of affairs found in those cases of 
long standing." Plaintiff'~s counsel then asked the 
doctor, "Presuming that Mr. Soliz suffered two 
ruptured cervical discs as you've indicated is your 
opinion in this accident in March of 196'2, what 
would you expect x-rays taken in September of 
1963 to show with respect to arthritic changes where 
these discs are?" After objection the doctor testi-
fied, "It's difficult to answer what I would expect. 
I can state that this is possible. It also could be 
that there may not be. It may take longer tim'e tha~ 
that for them to develop." (R. 167) 
Again, on page 168 of the 'Record, the doctor 
testified that "If one analyzes or understands the 
significance of these hypertrophic spurs or changes, 
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these in and of themselves are of no consequence 
and cause no symptoms until they become extreme 
in size and even then may not cause trouble. How-
ever, they do form because there has been a derange-
ment of the disc-vertebrae relationship." 
Dr. Bernson was cross examined at some length, 
none of which is significant except that he re-assert-
ed his opinion, stating that his diagnosis was based 
on a total summation of all things taken into ac-
count, including the exami'nation, the history, the 
x-rays and findings, the discogram findings and the 
onset of symptoms referrable or occurring subse-
quent to the purported injury (R. 170). He was 
further examined in regard to hypertrophic changes, 
which he defined as follows: "You have an opening 
formed where the nerve roots coming out betw·een 
two bones. Now, if the m~argins of these bones be-
come hypertrophic and spurs start forming and they 
sufficiently encroach on this opening beyond the -
the nerve root isn't as large as the opening. They 
can get a certain size before they reach a critical 
point. If they do then you're going to have symptoms 
from it." He further admitted the symptoms are 
the same 'as those found in a ruptured di'sc (R. 176). 
He concluded his cross examination by stating 
that he would not recommend an operation unless 
the patient wanted it, and based on the symptoms 
recited by the plain tiff he did not recommend sur-
gery (R. 185). 
On re-direct exami\na tion the doctor testified 
10 
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that he did not observe in his examination of the 
x- rays of Mr. Soliz any hypertrophic arthritic 
changes sufficient to cause the nerve root pressure 
or the troubles which he had attributed to the dam-
aged discs ( R. 186), and that there was no rel'ation-
shi p whatsoever between hypertrophic changes which 
he claimed were in the lumbar region and the symp-
toms which were referrable to the cervical region. 
During the course of Dr. Bernson's examina-
tion the plaintiff did not introduce any of the 
x-rays taken by Dr. Winter, those taken at the time 
the discogram was performed or any other x-rays 
about which Dr. Bernson had testified or upon 
which he stated that he had based his opinion. 
The trial of this action did not proceed as fast 
as had been anticipated and on the afternoon of the 
second day of the trial the court noted the presence 
of Dr. Reed S. Clegg, the defendant's witness (R. 
274). Although the plaintiff had not yet rested, the 
defendant was permitted to call Dr. Clegg as his 
witness out of order. Dr. Clegg testified that he 
was a Member of the American Board of Ortho-
pedic Surgery and had practiced orthopedic sur-
gery in Balt Lake City, after compl'eting his train-
ing, since December of 1945 ( R. 276). He testified 
that he had examined the plamtiff at the request 
of the defendant on September 6, 1963. Dr. Clegg 
took a history from Mr. Soliz which was substanti-
ally the same as Mr. Soliz had related ~to the other 
two doctors, m;ade a physical examihation of Mr. 
11 
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Soliz and x-rays were taken of the cervical, thor-
acic and lumbar areas of Mr. Soliz' spine under his 
supervision. These x-rays were marked as Exhibits 
D-7, D-8 and D-9 (R. 280) and recei~d in evi-
dence. Exhibit 'D-7 i 1s a side view of the cervical 
spine or neck. Exhibit D-8 is the same view of the 
thoracic spine. Exhibi1t D-9 is a similar view of 
the lumbar spine. Dr. Clegg testified that all of these 
x-ray.s taken of the lumbar, thoracic and cervical 
areas of the spine show some white changes about 
the margins of the vertebrae and some honey lip-
ping or calcium or bone deposits which are known 
as spurs or hypertrophic spurs and are typical of 
osteoarthritis ('R. 281). On the basis of these x-~ays 
and his examination his diagnosis of the condition 
of which the pla1n tiff complained was osteoarthritis 
or hypertrophic arthritis ( R. 27'9) . He further testi-
fied that in his opinion any sign's of injury which 
Mr. Soliz had sustained in the accident of March 
2'1, 19'62 had healed prior to His examination (R. 
282) ·and that if a person receives an accident or a 
traum~atic i'ntervertebral disc injury they would be 
aware of it at the ·time of their injury (R. '283.) 
He further gave as his opinion that he would not 
anticipate sufficient progre'S's in 'Mr. Soiiz' osteo-
arthritis to require any surgical fusion in the future 
('R. '29'9) . 
At the conclusion of the second day of trial 
plaintiff's counsel was asked about further wit-
n'esses, other than Mr. Soliz who had been testify-
12 
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ing at the time Dr. Clegg was put on the stand. 
Counsel for plaintiff stated he might have· one medic-
al rebuttal witness. 
The following morning, after the conclusion 
of Mr. Soliz' testimony, the pla:intiff recalled Dr. 
D. C. Bernson to the stand. The plaintiff had the 
x-rays which Dr. Bernson had testified about on 
his first examination and on which he had based 
his discussion and diagnosis marked a:s exhibits 
(P-10 through P-17). When it became apparent that 
plaintiff's counsel intended to have Dr. Bernson 
elaborate on the testimony he had given on his first 
examination, counsel objected to the testimony on 
the ground that it was repetitious and prejudicial 
and upon the further ground that plaintiff's counsel 
should be limited to a rebuttal of 'Dr. Clegg's testi-
mony (R. 334). Counsel further objected to the 
exhibits on the ground that no proper foundation 
had been laid for their admission, the people who 
took the x-rays and how the films were taken had 
not been identified and explained, and upon the 
further ground that they were repetitious (R. 337). 
Dr. Bernson was then permitted to testify con-
cerning Exhibits P-10, 11, 12 and 13, x-rays of the 
plaintiff's spine taken by Dr. Winter on M~ay 9, 
1962. He testified that Exhibit P-10 was of the 
dorsal spine and showed hype trophic changes (non 
traumatic) that had been testified to. He wa'S per-
mitted to identify Exhibits P-11, 12 and 13 as 
x-rays of the cervical area of the spine in extension 
13 
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and flexion and give his opinion there were no hyper-
trophic changes in the spine as shown by these x-rays 
(R. 3\3'9). The x-ray taken by Dr. Clegg (Exhibit 
D-7) was referred to him. Comparing that with the 
others, he found that the latter x-ray taken by Dr. 
Clegg did show hypertrophic arthritic changes ( R. 
340). 
Dr. Bernson was then permitted to re~tate his 
opin'ion given on his first examination in a different 
way. He was asked if he lrad a:ny opinion as to Why 
there was a difference between the two x-rays (R. 
34'1) and gave as his opinion ~that, "Thes·e are the 
typical changes that begin following ·a derangement 
of disc, rupture of the intervertebral dilscs." 
Dr. Bernson ide·ntified Exhibits P-14, 15, 16 
and 17 as the x-rays taken at the time the disco-
gram was done, which procedure he had discussed 
in detail in his previous 'testimony. He identified 
Exhibits P-16 and 17 as Polaroid pictures of the 
x-rays 'identified as Exhibi'ts P-14 and 15. He was 
then perm~tted, on the pretense of explaining the 
x-rays, to review hi:s opinion that the x-rays P-14 
through P-1 7 taken at the time the discogram was 
do'ne showed that the man had ~SUstained an inter-
vertebral or ruptured disc ( R. 343). No explana-
tion was ·ever given as to why these Exhibits were 
not available at the time Dr. Bernson first testified, 
nor why they were not introduced at 'that time. 
By way of summary of this medical evidence, 
Dr. Bernson in his first 'appearance on the stand 
14 
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testified that the plaintiff had sustained an inter-
vPrtebral or ruptured disc in the cervical area of 
his spine at the time of the accident and the injury 
he complained of was not, in hi's opinion, due to 
hypertrophic arthritis or osteoarthritis. Dr. Clegg 
refuted this testimony, stating that in his opinion 
his examination and 1the x-rays revealed that the 
plaintiff was suffering from hypertrophic or osteo-
arthritis and that this i's a part of ~he aging process 
not related to the injury. Dr. Bernson in his second 
appearance on 'the stand was permitted to reiterate 
the opinion given ·on his first appearance, that the 
condition of the plaintiff's back, including any hy-
pertrophic ·arthritis, was due to an intervertebral 
or ruptured disc. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT LI'MI'TING DR. 
BERNSON'S TESTIMONY GI'VEN UPON HIS SECOND 
APPEARANCE IN THE TRI.A:L TO THAT WH'ICH 
l\fiGHT BE ·CONSIDERED A REBUTTAL OF MATTERS 
TESTIFIED TO BY DEFENDANT'S DOCTOR. 
The rules of trial procedure are, it appe'ars to 
us, designed not only to prescribe an orderly man-
ner of proceeding in the trial of an action but to 
provide for the reception of evidence in such a man-
ner as to insure justice between the parties. Thus 
the plaintiff, who brings the action, is required to 
present his case. The defendant must then present 
his defense. Obviously, if defendant has simply met 
the proof of the plaintiff by denial, an explanation 
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or otherwise and has not introduced anything new 
into the case both parties have then had a fair op-
portunity to be heard. Obviously were the plaintiff 
then ·allowed to prove hi!s case for a second time the 
defendant would be prejudiced, unless we were to 
permit defendant to present his defense :for a sec-
ond time. This latter alternative would, of course, 
be preposterous since this could go on ad infinitum, 
a third time, a fourth time and so on. The rule which 
the courts have, therefore, adopted is as stJalted in 
53 Am. Jur.101: 
''While the trial court is vested with wide 
discretion in permitting departures from the 
usual order of proof when circumstances of 
the case require, th'e general rule is thait the 
patty who has the burden of proof - he who 
holds the affirmative ·and who would be de-
feated if no evidence were offered on either 
side - is en ti tied to open the evidence; he 
should then introduce all his evidence in chief, 
and after his adversary has introduced all 
his evidence in chief, the former should be con-
fined to rebuttal evidence. Generally speaking, 
on rebuttal ·he can give only such ev'idence 
in reply as tends to an~swer new mlatter in-
troduced by his adversary." 
It is our contention that this rule was violated 
'by the trial court to 1the prejudice of the defendant 
herein when the trial court permitted Dr. Bernson 
to 'testify for a second time as to m'atters which he 
had already testified to on nis firs1t appearance. 
The issue to Which the testimony of Dr. Bern-
son and Dr. Clegg in this case was addressed was 
16 
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whether or not the plain tiff, Eddie Soliz, had sus-
tained any injuries as a result of the automobile 
accident of M1arch 21, 1962 and, if 'SO, the nature and 
extent of those injuries. The issue was not what was 
shown on any particular x-ray, except to the extent 
that these x-rays furni·shed the basis for the doctors' 
ultim·ate conclusions that plaintiff did or did not 
sustai'n injury 1and the nature and extent thereof. 
Dr. Bernson in his first appearance 1te·sfified 
in detail as to the history given to him by the plain-
tiff, the complaints which the plaintiff had made to 
him and the examinations which 'he had m1ade of 
the plaintiff. H·e tes1tified in detail as to the proce-
dure performed in doing a discogram, how dye in-
serted in'to the cervical area of the neck would show 
on x-rays made at the time land what the x-rays 
taken of Mr. Soliz' back at the time of the disco-
gram would show. Pre-supposing a proper identi-
fication, these x-rays would have been admissible 
as a foundation for the doctor's dilagnos'is. Ba~sed on 
these diagnostic tools and procedures, Dr. B·ernson 
arrived at the opinion that the plaintiff had sus-
tained a ruptured intervertebral dis'c a:t the time 
of or following the acciden:t :and that his complaints 
after the accident and at the time of the 'trial were 
related to this condition. He did not, however, stop 
here but, anticipating the defense, went on to tes-
tify that plaintiff's complaints were not the result 
of any hypertrophic or arthritic changes which had 
occurred in the plain tiff's back. 
17 
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I't was unfortunate that the defendant, in order 
to accommodate the court and Dr. Clegg, was forced 
to eall his doctor before the plaintiff hJad rested, but 
i't would be a manifest injustice to penalize the de-
fendant simply because he chose to accommodate 
the court and the doctor in this manner. Dr. Clegg's 
testimony did not introduce anything new into the 
case. It was addressed to the same issue as that of 
Dr. Bernson, the question of whether or not the 
plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, had sustained any injury as 
a result of the accident and the nature and extent 
thereof. Based on ~the history which he took, h'i1S 
exami'n1ation and his x-rays 'Dr. Clegg simply ar-
rived at a different conclusion than Dr. Bernson, 
tha;t is, that the plaintiff's complaints at the time 
of the trial were related to a condition of hyper-
trophic arthritis or osteoarthrit"iis and if the plain-
tiff were injured at the time of the accident he had 
recovered from such injuries and they were not 
apparenlt at the time of Dr. Clegg'1s examination. 
The defendant did introduce three x-~ays, Exhibits 
D..;7, D.:s and D-9, which constituted in part a foun-
dation for Dr. Clegg's ultimate conclusion. He testi-
fied that these x-rays evidenced a condition of hyper-
trophic or osteoarthri ti1s. 
rt may have been proper for the eourt to permit 
Dr. Bernson to take the stand again and testify 
whether in his opinion ~the x -rays, D-'7, 'D-8, and D-9 
did or did not show a condition of hypertrophic or 
osteoarthritis, which Dr. Bernson in fact did do, he 
18 
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being of the opinion that they did show such a con-
dition. It may even have been proper to put him 
back on the stand to ask him if in his opinion such 
a condition was consistent with his previously ex-
pressed opinion that the plaintiff had sustained a 
ruptured disc. But when the court permitted him 
to go further and to introduce the exhibi'ts to which 
Dr. Bernson had previously testified, those taken by 
Dr. Winter (P-10 through P-13) and those taken 
at the time of the discogram (P-14 through P-17) the 
eoul't, in our opinion, erred. Under the guise of 
comparing the x-rays, Dr. Bernson was simply giv-
en an opportunity to re-express his previously ex-
pressed opinion that the plaintiff had sustained a 
ruptured intervertebral disc. 
More important than this, however, i's that he 
was in effect given an opportunity to argue, which 
of course is not the function of :a witn~s's, that his 
opinion was more valid than that expressed by Dr. 
Clegg. 
This Court has held tha:t rebuttal evidence is 
limited to evidence made necessary by the adverse 
party's reply and that usually all rebuttal evidence 
which has not been made necessary by the oppon-
ent's case in reply will be excluded. Adams v. Lang, 
2 Utah (2d) 418, 275 Pac. (2d) 881. In that case 
the plaintiff and appellant hlad sought in the court 
below to elicit on rebuttal an expert's opinion as to 
the speed of the defendant. The witnesses for the 
appellant and the witnesses for the defendant had 
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all testified that the defendant was traveling any-
where between 30 and 40 miles per hour. The court 
below refused to admit the expert"s opinion, and this 
Court sustained i1t, saying: 
" ... ks sta:ted by Wigmore on Evidence, 
Third Ed., Sec.l873: 
'It is 'clear that the orderly presenta-
tion of each party's case would leave the 
proponent nothing ·to do, in his case in 
rebuttal, except to meet the new f1acts 
put in by the opponent in hi's case in 
reply. Everything relevant as a part of 
the ca'se in chief would naturally have 
been already put in; and a rebuttal is 
neceHSary only because, on a plea in de-
n:Ual, new subordinate evidential facts 
have been offered, or because, on an af-
firmative plea, its substantive flacts have 
been put forward, or because, on any is-
sue whatever, :facts discrediting the pro-
ponent's witnesses have been offered ... ' 
'Accordingly, it is well settled that, 
while the occasional difficulity of discrim-
ina1tion, and the frequency of inadvertent 
omi1ssions iand unexpected con tests, add 
emphasis to the general principle of the 
trial Court's discretion (ante, Sec. 1867), 
(it i'S always within the sound discretion 
of the court to admit evidence out of the 
pre'scribed customary order) yet the usu-
al rule will exclude all evidence which 
has not been made neces'Sary by the op-
ponent's case in reply ... ' 
"Appellant could have introduced the ex-
pert's opinion in her caJse in chief, no't having 
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done so, and under the facts of this case, it 
not being proper rebuttal, the court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to admit it 
after she had rested her case in chief." 
Nor may a pl:aintiff reserve a portion of his 
testimony which ~should be offered in his case and 
then use this testimony in rebuttal of defendant's 
testimony. In a California case, Bates v. Newman, 
264 Pac. 197, the plaintiff withheld two colored 
slides, which slides had been in his possession during 
the presentation of his case in chief, and sought to 
introduce the slides in rebuttal of the testimony of 
defendant's doctor. The appellate court held 'that the 
court below did not err in excluding the testimony, 
and said: 
"The law is established ~hat one who has 
the affirmative of an issue may not reserve 
a portion of his evidence until an opposite 
party has exhausted his evidence to negative 
that offered in the first ilnstance. If he does 
so the court may refuse to allow him to in tro-
duce additional evidence on the subject after 
defendant rests. (Lipman v. kshburn, 106 
Oal. App. 2d 616,620 (4), 235 P. 2a 627.)" 
In the case referred to, Lipman v. Washburn, 
106 Cal. App. 2d 616, 235 Pac. (2d) 6'217, the plain-
tiff sought to put on a Witness in hi's rebuttal testi-
mony to the effect tha:t the truck did not stop 
at a stop sign before entering the intersection. The 
court held: 
". . . Evidence that the truck did not 
stop before entering the intersection was an 
essential part of the case in chief. Plaintiff 
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did not have a right to withhold her testi-
mony for the purpose of offering it in re-
buttal. 
"It is well se'ttled that ~a pa~ty who has 
the affirmative may not reserve a portion of 
his evidence until the opposite p:arty has ex-
hausted his to negative that offered in the 
first instance, and if he does so, ·the court may 
refuse to allow him ~to come in and make out 
his case after the defendant rests ... " 
In a Montana case, Gustafson v. Northern Pac-
ific Railway Company, 351 Pac. f2d) 212, the 
court held, in an action for wrongful death of a 
motorist who was killed When rthe pickup truck he 
waJs driving s'talled on a railroad track and was 
struck by a train, the issue being the distance in 
which a train could stop, tha:t a retired engineer's 
testimony with respect ~to stopping distance·s was 
a part of 'the plain tiff'1s case in chief and that the 
court properly refused to permit such te'stimony 
as rebuttal. In that case the court said: 
"In her case in chief, plaintiff sought 
to prove the maximum distance that would 
be required to stop a train such as the one 
involved in the accident. The defendants, in 
their case, called three expert witnesses for 
the purpose of proving the distance required 
'to stop such a train. 'The evidence :adduced 
from defendants' witnesses differed consid-
erably from that presented in plaintiff's case, 
and tended to show that a greater distance 
was required. On rebuttal, plaintiff called a 
reti'red engineer, Charles Buls, 'and ~sougHt to 
get his opinion on 'the required stopping dis-
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tance through the use of a hypothetical ques-
tion. Defendants objected on the ground of im-
proper rebuttal, and the objection was sus-
tained. Plaintiff argues that Buls' testimony 
was proper rebuttal, in that it tended to dis-
prove, repel, and counteract the evidence of 
the defendants. Section 9'3-5101, R.C.M. 1947, 
requires that after the plaintiff and defend-
:ant have presented their case in Chief, they 
will thereafter be confined to rebutting evi-
dence. That which plaintiff sought to intro-
duce through witness Buls was clearly part 
of her ca:se in chief and was not rebutting 
evidence, 'vhich Is confined to that which tends 
to counteract new matter offered by the 'ad-
verse pa~ty. The court properly sus'tained the 
objecti'on." 
In an Oregon vase, Henderson v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 219 Pac. (2d) 170, the question 
before the court was, wha!t was the cause of the 
plaintiff's loss of leg. The dase i's best summarized 
in the words of the court: 
"In his case in chief the plaintiff intro-
duced no evidence concerning any pre-exist-
ing diseased condition. Hi's only medical wit-
ness, Dr. Howard H. Mintz, testified in chief 
on the basis of a hypothetical question that 
'the plaintiff's injury would ltave called for 
immediate medical attention, and plaintiff 
rested his case without any medieal evidence 
whatever that the injury caused the lo'ss of 
his leg. The defendant then established by 
uncontradicted evidence that 1the plaintiff, at 
the time of the injury, was suffering from 
arteriosclerosis in his left leg, which, in the 
opinion of Dr. Dodson, who amputated the 
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leg, and Dr. Frank R. Menne, the patholo-
gist who examined the leg after the amputa-
tion, was so severe that it caused ~angrene 
to s~t in, necessitating amputation. There-
after, in rebuttal, the plaintiff undertook to 
prove the charge in his complaint (made in 
the alternative) that the cause of !amputa-
tion was aggravation of the arteriosclerosis 
by the blow. The court, without oiJjection on 
the part of the plaintiff, submitted 'the ques-
tion of aggravation to the jury as the only 
ques'ti1on for their consideration on this ph:ase 
of the case. Counsel for the plain1tiff expressly 
conceded on the oral argument here that the 
plainti'ff had 'a pronounced condition of ar-
teriosclerosis' and that the issue in the case 
was whether 'the arteriosclerosis caused the 
gangrene just by that disease developing of 
itself' or the disease was 'aggravated and 
lighted up by receiving thi's blow on the leg 
by this flying, heavy chisel.' 
"From the foregoing it will be seen that 
what the plaintiff did was to attempt to 
prove in rebuttal, instead of in his case in 
chief, that the alleged accident was the proxi-
mate cause of aggravation of arteriosclerosis 
1and the consequent loss of his leg. ThiiS pro-
cedure was objected to by the defendant, and 
the adverse ruling is assigned as error. It is 
unnecessary to pas·s on the question, since the 
judgment must be reversed for other reasons. 
It should be observed, however, fuat, what-
ever may have been the justification for this 
novel course, there will be no excuse what-
ever for any simil'ar procedure on another 
trial. It will then be the duty of the plaintiff 
to establish the fact of aggravation of 1a pre-
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existing diseased condition (if 'that is what 
he continues to rely upon) as a part of his 
case in chief, and he should not be permitted 
to reserve for his rebuttal the proof of proxi-
mate cause, thus seeming to cast upon the 
defendant the burden of showing that the 
allPged aggravation was not the proximate 
cause of the loss of plaintiff's leg." 
It is our contention 1tha t there was nothing new 
introduced into this case by fue opinion of Dr. Clegg, 
who simply disagreed with the dilagnosis of Dr. 
Bernson and described ·a different condition than 
Dr. Bernson had described. Therefore, the evidence 
adduced from Dr. Bernson in his ·second appearance 
was improper if intended to meet the opinion of Dr. 
Clegg in that 'there wa·s nothing new in the case 
·which called for rebuttal or, if not considered in that 
light, Was improper since it attempted to intro'duce 
in rebuttal evidence which was properly a part of 
the plaintiff's case in chief and should have been 
introduced as part of hi's testimony at that time. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
X-RAYS RECEIVED AS EXHIBITS IN THE CASE TO 
BE TAKEN INTO THE JURY ROOM. 
At the time this case went to 'the jury the court 
did not allow the defendant's x-rays (Exhibits D-7, 
D-8 and D-9) and the plaintiff''s x-rays (Exhibits 
P-10, P-11, P-12, P-13, P-14 and P-15) to go to 
the jury, but did allow plaintiff's Exhibits P-16 
and P-17 (which were photographs in black and 
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white of x-rays taken, P-14 and P-1'5) to go to the 
jury. The defendant excepted to thi1S 'and further 
asse~ted that if the jury was going to get a part of 
'the x-rays they should have them all ( R. 35'6). The 
court stated his reason for hrs action as follows (R. 
356): 
"By way of clarification on that matter, 
the ·Oourt might state for the record it's ~this 
Court's understanding 1tha't P-16 and P-17 
were not photographs of the corresponding 
numbered X-rays, but were independent 
photographs taken on Polaroid film and were 
then a matter of seconds or the most minutes 
apart from same. And rt appeared to the Court 
thJa:t these Polaroid positive photographs could 
at least to ·an extent be 1interpreted by lay 
persons, to-wit: the jury; whereas X-~ays 
themselves with or without a viewbox areal-
most impossible of intelligible interpretation 
by lay people, no-wit: a jury. You m'ay pro-
ceed.'' 
The court was in error in stating that P-16 
and P-17 were not photographs 'Of the corre'spond-
ing numbered x-rays hut independent photographs. 
Dr. Bernson 'testified (R. 336): 
"'These 1are essentially identical 'to the 
X-rays. However, they are Polaroid exposures 
or films taken which makes a posi'tive in-
stead of a negative. 'This i's done because 'they 
can be developed in ten seconds and we can 
examine fuem rather 'than sitting waiting 
somewhere in the neighbbrhood of ten or 
twelve minutes ·to develop 1the film. So these 
were just to check the film1s for a permanent 
record .. " 
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It would appear to us that the court's action 
was prejudicial in two respects. First, the Exhibits 
constituted evidence in the case and the jury should 
have before i't all of the evidence introduced at the 
tri1al on which to base their verdict. More important, 
however, in our mind is the fa~t that the court let 
the jurors take Exhibits P-16 and P-17 (which were 
pictures taken at the time the disco gram was per-
formed and which, in Dr. Bernson's opinion, showed 
a ruptured disc) but did not allow the x-rays taken 
by Dr. Clegg (Exhibits D-7 through D-9) to be 
taken in to the jury room. There appears to be no 
reason why a jury is more competent to interpret 
a black and whi1te photograph of the spine and what 
i't shows than they are to interpret the usual x-ray. 
And the withholding of one set of exh'ibits and the 
submission of the other would seem to constitute a 
representation by the court, itself, that those Exhi-
bits which he allows to go into the jury room are 
worthy of belief and that those which he withholds 
are not worthy of belief. 
The propriety of permitting the jury to take 
x-ray pictures introduced into evidence w1fu them 
into the jury room has been annotated in 10 A.L.R. 
(f!d) 918. Generally speaking, in all of the cases 
contained in the annotation the complaint was the 
opposite of that asserted here, the complaint being 
that It was error to allow the x-rays to be 'taken 
into the jury room. In every ca:se cited in the anno-
tation it was held that x-ray photographs constitute 
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evidence to be taken, or which may be taken by the 
jury into the jury room after they retire to deli-
berate on the verdict. 
Rule 47(m) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would appear to be conclusive of the matter. 
!The rule provides: 
"Upon retiring for 'deli'bera!tion the jury 
m1a.y take with them the instructions of the 
court and all exhibits and all papers which 
have been received as evidence in the cause, 
except depositions or copies of such papers as 
ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be 
taken from the person having them in posses-
sion ; and they may !also take with them notes 
of the testimony or other proceedings on the 
trial taken by themselve's or any of them, but 
none taken by any other pe:rson." 
According to the case of Jensen v. Dibel, 69 
N.W. (2d) 108 (Minnesdta) 
"The better practice would be Ito intro-
duce in evidence, for whatever purpose allow-
ed by trial court any objeets such 'as models, 
tools, equipment useld by experts for illustra-
tion, explanation, or experiments or other 
objects which counsel m'ay want to have sent 
wrth the jury during deliberations." 
The court did indicate in tha:t case, however, that 
the court may, with proper instructions, withhold 
or restrict 'the use of exhibits by the jury, which was 
not done in tllis case. 
The case of White v. Walker, 273 N.W. 499 
(Iowa), illustrates the harm of w!thholding exhi-
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bits from the jury, especiaJly if no explanation is 
given to the jurors as to the reason the exhibits are 
being withheld. In that case exhibits were with-
dl~awn from the jury after the jury had gone out 
to commence their deliberations. The lower court 
decided i't had erred in this respect and granted a 
new trial. The appellate court, in sustaining the 
granting of a Motion For New Trial, sai1d: 
"The court was within i'tJs province in 
holding thia!t the jury might have got a wrong 
and prejudicial impression as to the admissi-
bility and importance of 'the exhibits from the 
fact ~hat they were withdrawn summarily 
from their consideration without explana-
tion." 
Commenting upon the court'·s opinion that 'the 
x-rays could not be understood by the jury, it was 
said in Tea~as Employers Insurance AssocW,tion v. 
Crow, 221 S.W. (2d) 2'35, that x-rays sought to be 
introduced into the evidence could not be excluded 
on the ground that they were technical and unin-
telligible to the average juror. 
Thus, it is seen 'that the court erred in this case 
in withholding Exhibits D-7 through D-9 land P-1 0 
through P-15 from the jury, ·and that this error 
was prejudicial to the defendant in that i!t might 
have created the impression in the minds of the jury 
that the court did not consider the evidence shown 
by those exhibits, that is the testimony of Dr. Clegg 
which is illustmted by Exhibits D-7 through D-9 
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and the evidence of pre-existing difficulty in the 
back as illustrated by Exhibi1ts P-10 through P-13, 
important. 
POINT HI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
The instruction which the defendant deems pre-
judicial in 'this case is the court's Instruction No. 8, 
the first part of which reads as follows ( R. 43) : 
"A motorist who haJS the right of way 
need not anticipa'te sudden outbreaks of negli-
gence on the part of other drivers. In fact, the 
failure to observe the happening of the negli-
gent acts would be a proximate cause of the 
coll'ision only when by observing, 1the motorist 
who hiad tfue rigHt of way could have avoided 
'the resulting collision." 
In reading this instruction we must keep in 
mind that the court had already found negligence 
on the part of 'the defendant and that the issue be-
fore the jury was the question of whether or not 
the plaintiff, Eddie Soliz, was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. The error in the instruction, in our 
opinion, When read in light of the fact tha:t the court 
had previously found liability on the part of the 
defendan1t, is that it constitutes a finding by the 
court that Eddie Soliz had the right of way; that 
the negligence on 'the part of the defendant was a 
'sudden outbreak of negligence' and that pl'aintif 
had no duty whatsoever to observe any negligence 
on the part of the defendant. 
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Not only was the law incorrectly stated, but 
there was no necessity for the statement in view of 
Instruction No. 12, wherein the jury was properly 
instructed ( R. --17) : 
" ... Moreover, a person who, himself, is 
exercising ordinary care has a right to assume 
that dthers, too, will perform their duties 
under the l~w and has a further right to rely 
on ~that assumption. Thus, it is not negligence 
for such a person to fail to anticipate injury 
Which can come to him or others only from 
a violation of law or duty by !another. How-
ever, an exception should be noted: The right 
just defined does not exist when it is reason-
ably apparent to one, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should be apparent to him, 
that another is not going to perform his duty." 
In the case of Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 
132 Pac. (2d) 114, it was held that the court, in 
giYing instructions, must not resolve conflicts in 
the evidence for the jurors nor indicate what par-
ticular testimony 'the trial court believes correctly 
states the facts. That was a case :for assault and 
battery in which the plaintiff claimed that she was 
struck by an employee of the defendant and injured. 
The court instructed the jury 
"The court instructs you that if you be-
lieve from the evidence that the plla;intiff was 
pregnant at the time she was rendered uncon-
sC'ious by the blow delivered by one of the 
defendan'ts' employees, and as a result of said 
blow and being knocked to the floor she suf-
fered a miscarriage and thereby 'the loss of 
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her unborn child, you may award her money 
damages for the loss of said unborn child." 
(Italics added. ) 
The court further said: 
"The foregoing instruction disregarded 
entirely 'the fact thaJt there was considerable 
dispute and conflict in the evidence. The in-
s~ruction, standing alone, would amount to 
an 'instruction to find in favor of the plain-
tiff if the jury found tha;t plaintiff was preg-
nant at the time she was struck, and if they 
also found that a miscarriage re·sul'ted. 'The 
instruction assumes that defendants' employ-
ees were to blame for what occurred, and that 
the evidence was uncontradicted as to the fol-
lowing: (1) ThaJt plaintiff was 'rendered un-
conscious' by the 'blow,' and (2) that she was 
knocked to the floor. The instruction is so 
worded that it indicaJted to ·fue jury a belief 
on ~the part of the court that defendan'ts' em-
ployees were hi:aJmeworthy irrespective of the 
acts of plaintiff. As stated in State v. Sey-
mour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 789, 792: ~courts, 
in charging jurors, should be very careful not 
to assume any material fact or facts. Jurors, 
who are laymen, :are always eager to follow 
the opinion or judgment of the court, and if 
the court assumes any material fact 'in the 
charge, the jurors are most likeiy to follow the 
as'Sumptions of the court. Indeed, we must 
a;ssume that su~h is ~the case unless the record 
clearly shows the cont~ary.'" 
Another instruction of this type was involved 
in the ca:se of I vie v. Richar!Mon, 9 Utah (2d) 5, 
3136 Pac. ('2d) 781. That was 'an acti1on brought by 
3'2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a pedestrian for injuries sustained while crossing 
the street between crossings. In that case the court 
said: 
"Of more importance is the error assign-
ed in giving Instruction No. 10. It sta:tes that 
the driver of a vehicle, '* * * emerging from 
• * • any * * * driveway, or building, shall 
stop such vehicle immediately prior to driv-
ing on to a sidewalk * * * and shall yield 
the right of way to any pedestri;an * * * to 
aYoid collision, * * * .' This instruction is a 
correct state1nent of the law, but it is not 
applicable to the instant fact situation. The 
pra.in tiff was ndt on a sidewalk or a sidewalk 
area. The failure of the defendant to stop, if 
he did, had no causative effect in this inci-
dent. No1· was the plaintiff in any area where 
she necessarily had the right of way over the 
defendant. It was simply a situation where 
each had the duty to use due care for the 
safety of themselves and each other. The 
~1bnYe instruction might well have had the 
effect, as the defendant contends, of giving 
the jury the impres1sion that the plaintiff was 
entitled to the right of way, iand therefore 
was in error in this fact situation." 
POINT IV. 
THE VERDICT OF THE ·JlURY IS EXCESSIVE 
A~D APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE 
INFLUE~CE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
The prejudicial effect of the cumulative error 
committed by the court in this case is reflected in 
the verdict of the jury. Although the plainltiff had 
only incurred $446.25 special damages he recovered 
a general verdict in the amount of $15,000.00 (R. 
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33). Thiis in spite of the testimony of his own doc-
tor, David E. Smith, that the plaintiff had had tile 
same complaints prior to the accident of March 21, 
19'62 as those he had afterward but that the symp-
toms seemed to increase after the accident, and the 
plain tiff's own admission to the same effect. It 
means tha:t 'the jury must not have taken into con-
s'ideration the fact that there was no immediate 
complaJint of pain in the back at the time of the 
accident, nor until some three weeks later, which 
is ndt the usual pattern when an intervertebral disc 
is sustained. It completely ignores 'the testimony of 
Dr. Clegg to the effect that the plaintiff's present 
condition is a result of hypertrophic or osteoarthritis 
and not a ruptured disc. It Shows no consideration of 
Dr. Clegg's testimony to the effect that plaintiff 
had completely recovered from any ailment which 
he may have suffered as a resu]t of the accident. 
The verdict does not reflect any ;consideDation having 
been given to the fact that the plaintiff had not at 
the time of the trial had an operation on his back; 
nor 'bo lthe fact 'that his own doctor did not recom-
mend one at the time; nor the possibility that an 
opeDation may not be required. 
The jury seems to have bought the story of Dr. 
D. C. Bernson Hhook, line and sinker", but i't is sub-
mitted 'that tnis could have easily been anticipated 
from the fact that the court erroneously permitted 
Dr. Bernson to testify ·to the same thing on two 
occasions, and then indicated its approval of Dr. 
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BPrnson's tPstimony by withholding from the jury 
all of the exhibits in the case except those illustrat-
ing the discogram to which Dr. Bernson had testi-
fied. 
The fact that a verdict is greater than another 
jury or the Supreme Court migh't award, or even 
more than the evidence justifies, does not conclu-
sively show that it was the result of passion, pre-
judice or caprice on the part of the jury so as to 
necessarily entitle the defendant to a new trial, 
Pauly v. JltlcCarthy, 184 Pac. (2d) 123, 109 Utah 
-131. 
On the other hand, as said in Stamp v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 5 Uta!h (2d) 397, ·303 
Pac. ( 2d) 279, 
"Not every verdict that 'appears to be 
excessive will warrant a new trial or a reduc-
tion in the award, but the consideration which 
a court owes to a jury cannot be permitted to 
blind our eyes where the award can be ac-
counted for only by the presence of passion 
or prejudice." 
"'"ere this simply a matter of a difference of 
opinion as to the reasona:bleness of the jury's award 
in this case and were there no error in 'the record 
on which the jury may have gone awry, this might 
simply be a case where the defendant is a:sking this 
Court to substitute its op'inion for that of the jury. 
That is not the point that the defendant wishes to 
make in this case. His point is that the amount of 
the verdict in this case shows the extent to which 
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the defendant was prejudiced in the court below, 
iand that by reason of the prejudice he is entitled 
not to a reduction of the damages but 'to a new 
trial. We submit that rthe court, in determining the 
adequacy of the award in this case, should take into 
consideration the record in the court below and de-
termine whether or not the verdict was rendered un-
der ~any misapprehension of ·tJhe evidence or instruc-
tions. As was said by this Court in Saltas v. Affleck, 
99 Utah 381, 105 Pac. (2d) 176, 
"As stated in the case of Hirabelli v. Dan-
iels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172, and quoted with 
approval in the recent case of Ch!atelain v. 
Thackeray, Utah, 100 P. 2d 191,198: 'Weare 
* * * slow to interfere witll a ruling granting 
or refusing a new triaJ on questions relating 
to damages.' 
''While we so sltated, we also held tha:t the 
amount of the verdict i's a matter exclusively 
for the jury. On the ground of adequacy of 
the verdict alone, the court may not interfere 
with the jury's verdict. However, if inade-
quacy or excessiveness of the verdict presents 
a situation that such inadequacy or excessive-
ness shows a disregard by the jury of the evi-
dence or the instructions of the court 'as to 
the law applicable to the case as to satisfy 
the court that the verdict was rendered under 
such disregard or misapprehension of the evi-
dence or instructions or under ~he influence 
of passion or prejudice then the court may 
exercise its discretion in the interest of jus-
tice and grant a new trial. It may be that a 
verdict small in :amount or large in amount 
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is clearly the result of passion or prejudi~e. 
It is seldom that the am'Oun t of the verdict 
standing alone is so inadequate or excessive as 
to indicate passion or prejudice. Miller v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 
865. In order to eliminate speculation as to 
the basis of the exercise of judicial discretion 
in granting new trials, the record should show 
the reasons and make it clear the court is not 
invading the province of ~he jury. The trilal 
court should indicate wherein there was a 
plain disregard by the jury of the instructions 
of the court or the evidence or what consti-
tuted bias or prejudice on 'the part of the 
jury. If no reasons need be given the province 
of the jury may be invaded at will. With no 
indication as to the basis for exercise of the 
power vested in the court to grant new trials 
the appeal tribunal would be left to analyze 
the rna tter from the evidence, the record and 
the instructions. It would be required to search 
out possible reasons :for agreeing or disagree-
ing with the trial court in the exercise of a 
discretion. The exercise of a judicial discre-
tion must be based upon some facts notwith-
standing great latitude is accorded the trial 
court in such ma:tter. Klinge v. Southern Paci-
fic Co., 89 Utah 284, 57 P. 2d 3'67, 105 A.L.R. 
204." 
CONCLUSION 
Although it has been ~ouched 'in legal language, 
boiled down to its simplest terms, what the defend-
ant in this case contends is 1Jhat he did not receive 
a fair trial on the issues in the court below and 
that by reason of this the verdi~t of the jury is more 
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than might reasonably have been expected unde1 
the evidence of injury and the medical evidence ir 
the ca'Se. The action of the court below, in allowin~ 
the plaintiff's doctor to testify to the same rna tter 
twice and in withholding from the jury the defend-
ant's exhToits and those indicating a pre-existing in-
jury, was such as 'to lend credence to the plaintiff's 
claim ·and to influence the jury to return a verdict 
which, in our opinion, is clearly excessive. As was 
said by this Court in !vie v. Richardson, supra, 
" ... The question is whether the case was 
presented to the jury in such a manner that 
it is reasonable to believe there was a fair 
and impartial analysis of the evidence and a 
just verdict. If errors were committed which 
prevented this being done, then a new trial 
should be granted, whether it resulted from 
one error, or from several errors cumulative-
ly. We expressly do not mean to say that trivia 
which would be innocuous in themselves can 
be added together to make sufficient error to 
result in prejudice and reversal. The errors 
must be real and substantial and such as m1ay 
reasonably be supposed would affect the re-
sult. However, errors of the latter character, 
whlich may not themselves justify a reversal, 
may well, when considered together with 
others, render i't clear that a fair trial was 
not had. In 'Such event justice can only be 
served by the granting of a new trial, :absent 
the errors complained of . . . " 
It is submitted that the errors inherent in the 
record of this trial were substantial and were such 
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as may reasonably have been supposed to have af-
fected the result of the trial. It is, therefore, urged 
that this Court grant the defendant a new tria:I. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Attorneys for DeferukLnts 
and Appellants 
520 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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